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We apply stochastic dominance tests to investigate trends in inequality in Australia over 
the period 1983 to 1998. Results show significant levels of inequalities in the income 
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groups. We further find that the impact of the government’s tax and transfer 
redistribution scheme varied greatly among the different demographic groups. After tax 
and transfers are made, significant gains in welfare levels were observed for migrant and 
single-parents households compared to their non-migrant and couple-parent counterparts 
respectively. In contrast, welfare levels of male-headed households continue to dominate 
those of female households post tax and that there is limited government capacity for 
closing the existing gap in incomes and expenditures among households without 
children. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Singular measures of income and consumption inequality provide useful though limited 
views of actual disparities in welfare and living standards in the population.  Such 
indices are instructive in providing complete orderings of distributions as they appear 
comprehensible and unambiguous in many applications. At the same time, however, 
singular measures are known to suffer from the lack of universal acceptance of the value 
judgments of the underlying welfare functions
i. Contradicting conclusions can thus 
emerge and present problems for policy analysis and decision making.  
 
An alternative procedure for analysing distributions is to use the stochastic dominance 
approach which rank welfare situations over very wide classes of welfare functions.  The 
stochastic dominance (SD) approach uses a systematic method for a pairwise 
comparison of points in two distinct distributions – so it uses more information, presents 
a fuller picture of existing inequality level (at all possible points of comparison)  and as 
such avoids the overly narrow cardinalisation of welfare functions as is done by indices. 
Conclusions drawn from SD analysis are thus more robust and more useful in the wider 
policy sense.  
 
Recent longitudinal studies on inequality among households in Australia indicate a 
widening of the gap between the rich and the poor in the country.  In their study 
comparing trends in income and consumption inequality, Barrett, et al (2000a) find that 
that both income and consumption inequality rose by significant amounts between 1975 
and  1993, and that  consumption inequality rose by much less than. This finding is 
consistent with earlier findings by  Harding (1997), Harding and Szukalska (2000).  It is 
also evident in other countries as well with economic inequality is also seen as  rising 
over time in the US (Cutler & Katz 1992) and in Canada (Pendakur 1998). Pendakur  
(1998) claims that fluctuations in both income and consumption inequality is 
countercyclical – they are high in time of recession and low in times of prosperity. 
 
Unlike the US and Canada however, Barrett, et al (2000) analyses show that 
demographic changes in the population (such as aging of the population and change in 
family structures) account for only a minor component of the overall growth in   3
economic inequality in Australia.  Further, they find that between 1975 and 1993, both 
income and consumption inequality increased but inequality of incomes rose more than 
inequality of consumption and conclude that  a significant fraction of the changes in 
income inequality levels represent increases in the variance of transitory income 
fluctuations which households have some facility to smooth.  
 
In this paper, we examine trends in the distribution of income and consumption among 
Australian households using stochastic dominance analysis. Using micro-unit records 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, we investigate trends in inequality over the 
period 1983 to 1999. Over this 15-year period, the Australian government made 
substantial changes to the social welfare system in an attempt to minimize economic 
inequality as the economy grows; it would be useful to know whether these policy 
changes have in fact made a significant positive impact on the overall distribution. The 
progressivity of current tax policies and the effectiveness of the government’s social 
welfare program can be wholistically assessed and evaluated using this information; 
appropriate improvements/adjustments can thus follow.  Further, for many economic 
analysts and social scientists, it would also be very useful to know the impact of the 
government’s redistribution policies on particular household types and family groups. 
This paper thus provides new insights into inequality in Australia as we examine these 
trends within population groups. We put particular concern to the study of vulnerable 
households, to include migrant families, families with children, single-parent families 
and families headed by females. Results from this analysis can provide guidance in 
designing more effective assistance programs for such economically disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
The use of the stochastic dominance approach is an important feature of this paper. SD 
analysis consider the whole distributions of outcomes, and thus can provide crucial 
details and potential important distinctions between different parts of the distribution. 
The technique will be applied to compare various incomes and expenditures 
distributions across various population groups and over time. Conclusions drawn will be 
compared to those derived from the implementation of singular measure which we also 
implement here for comparison purposes.  
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This paper has the following structure. After a brief introduction and overview in 
Section 1, Section 2 introduces and describes some tests of stochastic dominance 
(describes theory of SD), their distributional characteristics and the bootstrap technique 
used. Section 3 presents the data, variable definitions and some summary statistics. 
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Tests for Stochastic Dominance 
 
The term stochastic dominance is generally used in decision theory to refer to situations 
where one outcome (or a probability distribution over outcomes) can be ranked as 
superior to another.  Testing for stochastic dominance of one distribution over another 
involves a pair-by-pair comparison of the “distances’ at a finite number of points or 
ordinates on the curves. Ranking results are based on preferences (eg a higher value of 
an outcome is preferred), but require only limited knowledge of preferences with regard 
to the distribution of outcomes. Several tests for stochastic dominance (SD) have been 
proposed in the literature.  In this paper, we employ SD test procedures based on a 
generalized Kolmogorov-Smirnov test discussed in Linton et.al (2005) and Maasoumi 
and Hestmati (2000). Alternative implementations of this type of tests have also been 
examined by several authors including MdFadden (1989), Klecan and McFadden (1991) 
and Barrett and Donald (2003).  
 
To describe the tests, use first set the following notation.  Let X and Y be two outcome 
variables for any two groups or periods. These variables will either be income or 
expenditures of households, before or after tax incomes, at different points in time, 
regions for some given population. For ease of exposition though, we will simply refer 
to both as income for the moment. We let  () i X and  () i Y denote the i
th order statistics, and 
() F x and  () Gx denote the cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) of X and Y 
respectively. Assuming general von Neumann-Morgenstern conditions, we let  1 U  denote 
the class of social welfare functions u such that welfare is increasing in income (), and 
2 U  denote the class of all utility functions in  1 U  for which  "0 u ≤ . This strict concavity 
assumption represents a strong aversion to higher dispersion of incomes across   5
individuals; in other words, a high concentration of incomes (or expenditures)  is 
undesirable. Quantiles qx(p) and qy(p) are implicitly defined by  () [ ] p p q X F = ≤ . 
 
Two critical definitions are now in order.  One, X First Order Stochastic Dominates 
(FSD) Y, denoted  1 X Y f , if and only if any one of the following equivalent conditions 
holds:  
(1)  () ( ) EuX EuY ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ≥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ for all  1 uU ∈ , with strict inequality for some u. 
(2)  () () Fx Gx ≤ for all x in the support of X, with strict inequality for some x. 
(3)  () () xy qp qp ≥ for all 01 p ≤≤ . 
If  1 X Y f , then the expected welfare from X is as least as great as that from Y for all 
increasing welfare functions, with strict inequality holding for some utility function(s) in 
the class. 
 
Two,  X Second Order Stochastic Dominates (SSD) Y, denoted  2 X Y f , if and only if 
any of the following equivalent conditions holds: 
(1)  () ( ) E uX EuY ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ≥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  for all  2 uU ∈ , with strict inequality for some u. 
(2)  () ()
xx
F t dt G t dt
−∞ −∞ ≤ ∫∫ for all x in the support of X and Y, with strict inequality for 
some x. 




x ∫ ∫ ≥
0 0  for all 01 p ≤ ≤  with strict inequality for some value(s) p. 
If  2 X Y f , then the expected welfare from X is as least as great as that from Y for all 
increasing and concave utility functions in the class U2, with strict inequality holding for 
some utility function(s) in the class.  
 
The tests of FSD and SSD are based on empirical evaluations of conditions (2) or (3) in 
the above definitions. Mounting tests on conditions (2) requires empirical cdfs and 
comparisons at a finite number of observed ordinates. Mounting tests on conditions (3) 
rely on the fact that quantiles are consistently estimated by the corresponding order 
statistics at a finite number of sample points. FSD implies SSD and higher orders
ii. 
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Following Maasoumi and Heshmati (2000), proceed with the KS type tests analysis by 
first defining a “maximal” sets (originally due to McFadden) as follows. We let 
{ } 12 , ,..., K X XX ℜ= be a set of K distinct random variables, and let  K F  denote the cdf of 
the k
th variable.  We define the set ℜ as first (second) order maximal if no variable in ℜ 
is first (second) order weakly dominated by another.  Further, we let 
() .1 2 , ,..., , 1,2,..., nn n K n X xx x n N ==  be the observed data. Assume  .n X  is strictly 
stationary and α −mixing. We assume  ( ) i i X F ,  K i , , 2 , 1 K =  are exchangeable random 
variables, so that our resampling of the test statistics converge appropriately. This is a 
less stringent assumption than independence of income distributions, particularly in our 
paper, as it will be more often the case that one distribution can be derived from the 
other (eg before and after tax scenarios). We also assume that  K F   is unknown and 
estimated by the empirical distribution fundtion ( ) kN k FX . Finally, we adopt the 
mathematical regularity conditions pertaining to von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) 
utility functions that generally underlie the expected utility maximization paradigm. We 
also assume that all the expectations involved are finite.   
 
Given the mathematical regularity conditions due to VNM, the first-order stochastically 
maximal variables in ℜ imply that a statistic d exists defined by 
(1)  () () minmax 0 ij ij x
dF x F x
≠
⎡⎤ =− > ⎣⎦  if and only if for each i and j, there exists a 
continuous increasing function u such that  () ( ) ij EuX EuX ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ > ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦.  
Similarly, the second order stochastically maximal variables in ℜ implies that a statistic 
s exists such that 
(2)  () () minmax 0
x
ij ij x sF F d μμ μ
−∞ ≠
⎡⎤ =− > ⎣⎦ ∫  if and only if for each i and j, there exists a 
continuous increasing and strictly concave function u such that  () () ij EuX EuX ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ > ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ . 
Now, assuming the stochastic process .n X , n = 1, 2, …, N to be strictly stationary and 
α −mixing with  ( ) () j Oj
δ α
− =  for some δ > 1, we have  d d N → 2  and  s s N → 2 where 
N d2  and  N s2  are the empirical versions of the test statistics defined as : 
(3)  () () 2 minmax Ni N j N ij x
dF x F x
≠
⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ and   7
(4)  () () 2 minmax
x
Ni N j N ij x sF F d μ μμ
−∞ ≠
⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ ∫ . 
 
The null hypothesis tested by these two statistics is that ℜ is not first (second) order 
maximal, i.e.,  i X  FSD (SSD) j X  for some i and j. We do not reject the null when the 
statistics are negative to a statistical degree of confidence. Kaur (1994) and Klecan et al 
(1991) show that when X and Y are independent, tests based on  N d2  and  N s2  are 
consistent. Furthermore, the asymptotic distributions of these statistics are non-
degenerate in the least favourable case, being Gaussian.  
 
In this paper, we estimate the empirical distributions by bootstrap methods. We compute 
N d2  and  N s2  for a finite number q of the income (expenditure) ordinates. Bootstrap 
samples (typically 1000) are generated from which empirical distributions of the 
differences of the  N d2  and  N s2  statistics, and their bootstrap confidence intervals are 
determined. The bootstrap probability of these statistics being negative and/or falling in 




3.  The Data  
 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on the series of four household 
expenditure surveys collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) over the 
period 1983 to 1998. The stochastic dominance tests and procedures described in 
Section 2 are applied to household unit record data from the 1983-84, 1988/89, 1993/94 
and, 1998/99 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) of the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS).  These are the latest body of data conducted of a series of surveys 
designed to obtain details of expenditure, income and a wide range of demographic 
characteristics of Australian private households on a nationwide basis.  The information 
on demographic characteristics, income and infrequent expenditure items (eg vehicle 
and property purchases, household bills) were recorded by personal interview and details 
of all other expenditures made by each household member, 15 years or more, during a 
two-week period were recorded in personal diaries
iii.  The public-use files were   8
representative of the Australian population and the sample of households enumerated 
evenly over the respective 12-month period
iv. 
 
The household is the basic unit of our analysis and consists of a person or group of 
people living together having common provision for food and other essentials of living. 
They will include both adults and children where children are those aged from the very 
young to 24; those over 18 are considered children as long as they are fully financially 
dependent on the parent(s) defined in the survey. We include all types of households in 
the total HES sample, but also need to define groups of households when we test 
hypotheses concerning particular groups. The population subgroups we consider are 
migrant v non-migrant, households with and without children, male-headed v female 
headed households,  
 
In this study, we analyse the distribution of household incomes and expenditures. For 
each year of the survey, we analyse four basic distributions:  
a)  Gross or  Pre-Tax  Income (GROSS) – defined as total household income from 
all sources. This includes all earned income from employment, own business or 
self-employment plus unearned income from interest on accounts and financial 
investments, property rent, worker’s compensation, child support and 
maintenance, superannuation, and scholarships; and,  
 
b)  Disposable or Post-Tax Income (DISP) – which is total household income less 
taxes plus all government benefits. These include all family allowances and 
parenting payments, and age, carer and disability pensions.  
 
c)  Total Expenditure (EXP1) - includes all expenditures on Current Housing, Fuel 
and Power, Food, Alcohol and Tobacco, Clothing and Footwear, Household 
Furnishings and Equipment, Medical and Health Care, Transport, Recreation and 
Entertainment and Personal Care. Total expenditures also include expenditures 
on Income Tax, Superannuation and Life Insurance, Mortgage Repayments and 
Other Capital Housing Costs.  
 
d)  Total Non-Durable Expenditure (EXP2) is used to measure non-durable 
consumption. This is EXP1 less expenditures on all household furnishings and 
equipment. 
 
Family income and expenditure data were divided by an adult equivalent scale to adjust 
for differences in family economies of scale in consumption. The adult equivalent scale 
(AES) used was the square-root of family size
v.  HES provides data for each year in   9
nominal terms so it is imperative that we also adjust these values for changes in prices 
over time. Thus, all nominal values are converted to 2003 dollars using the national 
consumer price index
vi.   Summary statistics in Table 1 shows that average incomes in 
real terms declined considerably in 1998 compared to 1993, but this level was still a 
significant improvement over average income levels in 1983 and 1988.   
Correspondingly,  real mean household expenditures were highest in 1993, dropped 
slightly in 1998; total expenditure levels were relatively lower in 1983 and 1988. Overall 
though, we note that the average household income across the population had increased 
only slightly over time, with the statistics also indicating wider dispersion of incomes in 
the later years. Average total expenditures of households tended to be higher than 
average incomes, and is also seen to have greater fluctuations over time.  
 
The changing structure of Australian households are evident from Table 1. First, it is 
seen that the proportion of female-headed households in the population have doubled in 
the last 15 years, increasing  from under 20 percent in 1983 to 40 percent in 1998/99.  In 
1983, only 2 in 10 households were found to be headed by females; in 1998,  we find the 
4 out of every 10 households surveyed are now headed by females. The summary 
statistics show that relative to male-headed households, particularly in the earlier survey 
years. Corresponding to this observation is the change in relative income levels: in 1983  
female-headed households tended to have lower incomes;  over time however, average 
income levels of female-headed households have risen much more than those of 
households headed by men. Further, it appears that the disposable incomes of female 
headed households are also more equally indicating greater net transfers accruing to 
them than their male counterparts.    
 
The proportion of single parent households have dramatically risen between 1983 and 
1998. In 1983, only 13 percent of household with children have 1 parent; in 1998 this 
figure has risen to 21 percent of all households with children. Average pre tax income 
levels of single parent households were clearly less than couple households, only 50 
percent in 1998, under 40 percent in the earlier years. But the table also shows that the 
gap in incomes is not as great as when disposable incomes are compared. Using this 
measure, disposable incomes of single parent families is about 60 percent that of couple 
parent families. This implies that the tax and transfer system does have an equalizing   10
effect on household incomes with greater benefits provided to single parents; and that 
the average equalizing outcome is in fact comparable to what is required by single parent 
– their expenditures are about 60 percent that of couple parent households. 
 
With regards to households with and without children, no significant changes were noted 
in terms of the population shares - they remain around 48 percent and 52 percent 
respectively over that span of 15 years. We also find that across the survey years, 
migrant households comprised about 29 percent of total households in the sample. On 
average, the incomes and expenditures of migrant households compared favourably with 
those of non-migrant households.  
 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
The tables in this section present the results of our stochastic dominance analysis for 
pairwise income and expenditure distributions across households in Australia. All of 
these are from 1000 bootstrap samples. Given distributions X and Y, the expression X >1 
Y denotes “X first order stochastic dominance of X over Y” and  X >2 Y denotes “X 
second order stochastic dominance of X over Y”. Where evidence of stochastic 
dominance appears, the number in brackets show probability of the test being negative.   11
 
All Households 
The first row of Table 2a tabulates the results for a pairwise comparison of gross or 
income tax distributions across the 4 years of the survey and sheds light on the 
movement of the overall income distributions over the time period in our sample frame. 
It shows that pretax income distribution in 1993 first and second order dominated both 
the 1983 and 1998 distributions, while the 1998 distribution first and second order 
dominated the 1988 pretax distributions. SD tests applied to 1983 and 1988 showed only 
second order dominance of the former over the latter year.  The 1983 and 1998 pretax 
distributions were not rankable.  
 
In terms of disposable or post tax incomes, the SD analysis indicated first and second 
order dominance of the 1993 distribution over the 1988 and 1998 distributions (same as 
in pretax income results). Taxes and transfers are seen to eliminate any dominance that 
the 1993 pre-tax distribution had over the 1983 distribution; the strong dominance 
results of the 1998 over 1988 pretax distributions were also eliminated by the tax and 
transfers during those years. 
 
In terms of total expenditures, first and second order stochastic dominance were 
observed for 1983 over 1988, and for 1993 over 1988 distributions of total expenditures 
(EXP1). Further, the 1993 EXP1 distributions showed second order stochastic 
dominance over the 1998 EXP1 distributions, while the latter second order stochastically 
dominated the 1988 EXP1 distribution. The 1983 and 1993 distributions were 
unrankable, as are the 1983 and 1998. If non-durable consumption EXP2 distributions 
are considered, the above dominance results hold with the addition of stronger evidence 
observed for the 1993 EXP2 distribution first order dominating the 1998 EXP2 
distribution, which in turns first order dominates the 1988 EXP2 distribution. 
 
 
It thus appears that the 1993 income and expenditure distributions are consistently 
significantly more equal compared to the other years’ distributions, with strong first 
order results showing in all pairwise comparisons except perhaps for 3 cases when no 
stochastic dominance were observed for the 1993 and 1983 posttax and expenditure   12
distributions.  This indicates that over the 15 years of the study period, level of 
inequality in the distribution of incomes and expenditures either improved significantly 
(as in pretax income) or remained steady during the first ten years, but that it grew worse 
in the course of the following 5 years.   
 
In Table 2b, results for comparison of pre and post tax income distributions are 
tabulated; it also includes results for the comparison of posttax income distribution and 
expenditure distributions. Some surprisingly simple results arise:  no stochastic 
dominance is observed for all pairwise comparisons made except for 1 case. This result 
broadly indicates that for all years, pre and post tax distributions are deemed unrankable 
(ie no one is better than the other) - implying that relative welfare in the population was 
not any better after government tax and transfers were made. The results also generally 
exhibited no stochastic dominance in the pairings when the test were applied to the  post 
tax and expenditure distributions. Except in 1998/99 when total expenditure and posttax 
incomes are compared: results show first and second order stochastic dominance of the 
former over the latter. Overall though, the indication is that taxes and transfers were not 
effective in equalizing income distributions – there were no discernable improvements in 
the distribution of incomes after tax and transfers were made in each year of the survey. 
 
Male-Headed v Female-Headed Households.  
We now break up the population into various groups and apply the tests to determine 
relative inequality levels existing within each group.  Strong differences in the inequality 
levels are observed when households are grouped by gender of the household head.  
Pretax income distributions for male-headed households are shown to first-order 
stochastically dominate those of female-headed households for each year of the survey 
except for 1988, where no ranking can be inferred ie no SD.  For 1983 and 1993, the 
tests show strong (first-order) stochastic dominance of the pre-tax income distribution of 
male-headed households (MHH) over that for female-headed households (FHH), with p-
values of 0.024 and 0.09 respectively. Results further show that any evidence of 
stochastic dominance in the distributions disappeared after tax and transfers were made 
for the years 1983-84, 1988-89 and 1993-94.  Strong evidence of stochastic dominance 
however  appears again in 1998; in fact, the larger p-values found for the SD tests on 
post income distributions showed that the tax and transfers favoured more the MHH   13
compared to the FHH,  and thus they have come out with a more equal income post tax 
distribution 1998 compared to their female counterparts. 
 
In terms of expenditure, it appears that the distributions for male-headed and female- 
headed households were comparable in the earlier years. First order stochastic 
dominance were strong in 1993 and 1998 (where MHH distribution SD dominated FHH 
distribution) where none was found in 1983 and 1988. We also find that the gap in 
welfare levels appeared stronger when non-durables expenditure distributions (EXP2) 
were considered, compared to when all/total expenditures (EXP1) were compared. 
 
We then compare the income and expenditure distribution of households with and 
without children using the stochastic dominance tests above. From Table 4 looking at the 
1983-84 results, we find second-order stochastic dominance of pre-tax incomes of 
households with children over those without children. Taxes and transfers appear to have 
corrected this imbalance, while expenditure distributions do not show any evidence of 
either year’s distributions stochastically dominating the other – for both total and non-
durable expenditure distributions. In 1988, pre-tax distributions for households with and 
without children appeared to be equally well off, but post tax distributions show greater 
equality among households with children than those without. 
 
In 1993-94, the income and expenditure distributions of households with children show 
very strong welfare dominance over those without children. First-order stochastic 
dominance is shown throughout – smaller p-values are observed for post tax incomes 
comparisons (indicating some but not a whole lot of improvement in welfare levels) 
while larger p-values are observed for non-durables expenditures compared to total 
expenditure (indicating greater degree of inequity). The same strong results apply to the 
1998-99 data, though the strength of the dominance is less pronounced (second-order 
only) compared to the 1993-94 results. 
 
Overall, strong dominance results are found for most pairwise SD test applications 
comparing household with and without children. In particular, households with children 
are shown to have a much more equal distribution of welfare than those of households 
without children. This is not surprising though. Families with children tend to be a more   14
homogenous group – with similar income and expenditure patterns and constraints.  In 
contrast, families without children are a more diverse group with more variant lifestyles 
indicating greater degrees of income and expenditure levels. Disparities in their 
distributions are therefore bound to be greater. In this light, taxes and transfers will have 
limited capacity to close the gap between the inequities that are evident in the 
distributions. 
 
Single parent vs Couple Parent Families 
We now consider distributions for single-parent (S) v couple-parent (C) families. Single 
parent families tend to struggle more in terms of meeting ends meet. They also tend to 
have less income but also get more government benefits. In comparing the income and 
expenditure distributions for these types of families, we want to know if single parent 
families have more highly unequal incomes or expenditures compared to couple family 
households. We also want to know the impact of the government redistribution program 
on the relative welfare levels of these groups.  
 
Results here are from Table 5. In 1983, pre-tax incomes of couple-parent families show 
greater equality levels compared to single parent families as evidenced by strong first-
order stochastic dominance effects. These differences however disappear after taxes and 
transfers are made; further, the expenditure distributions of these groups also do not 
show any dominance effects over the other. For 1988, the pretax income distribution of 
couple-parent households showed no evidence of being better than the distribution of 
pretax income of single-parent households. Comparison of post-tax incomes and the two 
types of expenditures show no change in this result. For 1993, pretax income distribution 
for couple parent families stochastically dominated the distribution for single parent 
households. This imbalance appears to have been corrected by the tax and transfer 
scheme of the government ie stochastic dominance of former over latter disappeared 
when applying the tests to compare post tax income distributions for the two household 
types. For 1998, we find no evidence of stochastic dominance in all the distributions that 
were compared and tested. 
 
Overall, the evidence gathered on the comparison of single-parent v couple-parent 
households show some evidence of significant relative disparities in welfare levels but   15
that tax and transfers impact significantly so as to make the distributions unrankable. 
This means taxes worked to equalize that distributions of single-parent households much 
more than couple-parent households so that it improves this distributions to levels that 
are at least as good as those found in couple-parent households. 
 
 
Migrant & Non-Migrant Subgroups: 
The final comparison group we have are between migrant and non-migrant households. 
Comparisons of welfare across migrant and non-migrant groups are important – migrant 
households are known to incur significant settling-in costs and it is important  to know 
how well government transfers are able to assist them over time relative to the 
mainstream non-migrant household.  
 
From Table 6, it is seen that the 1983 income and expenditure distributions of non-
migrant households (NM) clearly stochastically dominated those of migrant households 
(Mig). First order stochastic dominance was observed for pre-tax incomes and also non-
durable consumption; results on the SD analysis for posttax income distributions 
indicate a marked improvement in the distribution of migrant households in each of the 
survey years particularly, in 1983 and 1993. In 1983, the income distribution of non-
migrant households still dominated that of migrant households but significantly less so 
compared to that of pretax incomes. Specifically, evidence of first order dominance has 
disappeared completely post tax; and p-value for 2
nd order dominance is significantly 
smaller than in the pre-tax comparisons.   
 
In 1988, the income and expenditure distributions of migrant households showed no 
significant difference (no better; no worse) compared to those for non-migrant 
households - with test p-values of only .005 and .006 for comparison of pretax and post 
tax incomes, respectively. In 1993, however, the dominance relationship between the 
income distributions before and after tax were reversed. For this year, the results show 
that before tax, the income distribution for non-migrant household were more equitable 
compared to that of migrant households [with a 2
nd SD p-value of 16.7 percent]; post tax 
comparisons for these two groups reversed this trend and showed an even stronger 
stochastic dominance effect of  migrant income distribution over that of the non-migrant   16
– with a p-value of 47.4 percent. This means that, in 1993, the redistribution of incomes 
through tax and transfers did serve to close the gap in incomes among migrant 
households much more than it did incomes for non-migrant households. In 1998 
meanwhile, application of SD test comparing pretax incomes for migrant and non-
migrant households showed that the distribution for the migrant group stochastically 
dominated that of the non-migrant group by 1.6%. This 2
nd order dominance persisted in 
the comparison of post tax income although the resulting p-value is now greatly 
diminished to .04 percent. 
 
With expenditure distributions, migrant expenditure distributions were generally found 
more equally dispersed compared to those of non-migrants. Total expenditure 
distribution for 1988, 1993 and 1998 for migrant households all stochastically dominated 
their counterpart distributions for non-migrant households, except for year 1983 which 
showed the reverse relationship and therefore defied the general trend. It is nonetheless 
noted that the strength of the dominance results seem to have diminished over time with 
p-values dropping from 48% in 1988-89 to 28% in 1993-94 and down to 2% in 1998-99. 
We also applied the test to compare non-durable distributions and we find that the 
dominance relationships observed above are shown to hold, perhaps even more strongly, 
as evidenced by first-order stochastic dominance results.  
 
In summary, for the migrant and non-migrant group comparisons, we find that first order 
stochastic dominance was observed for pre-tax incomes and also non-durable 
expenditures; the disappearance of this first order dominance in the analysis of posttax 
income indicates a clear positive impact of the government’s tax and transfer scheme in 
improving the inequality levels in the population in 1983. In the subsequent years, 
however, the opposite dominance relationship is observed ie the income and expenditure 
distribution of migrant households now stochastically dominate those of non-migrant 
households.  The results show that the impact of the government tax and transfer 
program resulted in a strong reversal of the dominance relationship in 1993-94 pre and 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
 
The term stochastic dominance is generally used in decision theory to refer to situations 
where one outcome (or a probability distribution over outcomes) can be ranked as 
superior to another.  Testing for stochastic dominance of one distribution over another 
involves a pair-by-pair comparison of the “distances’ at a finite number of points or 
ordinates on the curves. Ranking results are based on preferences (eg a higher value of 
an outcome is preferred), but require only limited knowledge of preferences with regard 
to the distribution of outcomes. In this paper, we employ statistical test procedures for 
first and second order statistic dominance (FSD and SSD, respectively) of Lorenz and 
Generalised Lorenz curves.  This involves comparing the “distances” at finite points or 
ordinates on the curves, where these points/ordinates are represented by quantiles.  The 
tests used are multivariate generalizations of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics when 
weak dependence is permitted in the processes.   
 
We apply these tests to investigate trends in inequality and relative welfare levels in 
Australia over the period 1983 to 1998. We find that that when the SD tests are applied 
to income and expenditure distributions for the entire population, results show that net 
transfers to households do not make any significant improvement on the level of 
inequality existing for each year. However, when analysis is applied to particular 
population subgroups in the economy, the SD tests show that taxes and transfers do 
improve gross imbalances in the distribution of welfare within and between the groups.     
 
We find strong evidence of disparities in the relative welfare levels across a number of 
demographic groups in Australia. Application of stochastic dominance tests show 
greater levels of inequalities in the pretax distributions of male-headed over female 
headed households, of households with children over those without, and of couple 
parents families over their single-parent counterparts, and of migrant v non-migrant 
households. We then find that the impact of the government’s tax and transfer 
redistribution scheme varied greatly among the different demographic groups. For 
migrant and non-migrant households, tax and transfers appear to favour migrant 
households more so that they end up having a more equal income and expenditure level   18
post tax.  More favourable welfare outcomes also result for single-parents households 
compared to their couple-parent counterparts. On the other hand, we find that the 
welfare levels of male-headed households continue to dominate those of female 
households post tax and that there is limited government capacity for closing the existing 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Year: 1983-84  All  Male  Female  Without  With  Couple   Single   Non-   
   Households  Head  Head  children  children  Parents   parent  Migrant  Migrant  
Sample Size n  4492 79% 21% 53%  47%  87% 13%  72%  28% 
Taxable Income   566  624 348 559  543  594 214  570  557 
  (489)  (486) (435) (548)  (393)  (386) (255)  (468)  (495) 
Disposable Income  528  557 416 539  484  508 328  528  528 
  (331)  (338) (277) (364)  (393)  (278) (169)  (325)  (347) 
Total Expenditure  672  714 513 667  645  678 434  671  676 
  (469)  (467) (442) (498)  (408)  (411) (317)  (465)  (478) 
Year: 1988-89  All  Male  Female  Without  With  Couple   Single   Non-   
  Households  Head  Head  children  children  Parents   parent  Migrant  Migrant  
Sample Size n  7225 77% 23% 57%  43%  85% 15%  71%  29% 
Taxable Income   555  611 371 531  549  604 232  563  534 
  (503)  (498) (475) (529)  (455)  (458) (268)  (516)  (470) 
Disposable Income  500  528 409 501  470  497 313  505  490 
  (350)  (357) (305) (358)  (323)  (336) (160)  (356)  (332) 
Total Expenditure  654  696 514 638  644  684 412  651  659 
  (512)  (510) (492) (549)  (458)  (466) (320)  (527)  (470) 
Year: 1993-94  All  Male  Female  Without  With  Couple   Single   Non-   
  Households  Head  Head  children  children  Parents   parent  Migrant  Migrant  
Sample Size n  8389 61% 39% 52%  48%  81% 19%  71%  29% 
Taxable Income   912  1045 701  688  1092  1212 574  902  938 
  (826)  (880) (682) (652)  (930)  (968) (478)  (772)  (946) 
Disposable Income  781  874 634 581  939  1019  597  772  805 
  (564)  (586) (492) (451)  (601)  (623) (323)  (537)  (624) 
Total Expenditure  789  853 686 593  956  1030  638  781  808 
  (537)  (553) (493) (437)  (562)  (569) (402)  (533)  (545) 
Year: 1998-99  All  Male  Female  Without  With  Couple   Single   Non-   
  Households  Head  Head  children  children  Parents   parent  Migrant  Migrant  
Sample Size n  6892 60% 40% 52%  48%  79% 21%  72%  28% 
Taxable Income   622  703 500 606  628  701 355  627  611 
  (512)  (537) (445) (551)  (472)  (480) (311)  (498)  (546) 
Disposable Income  526  584 439 499  535  574 390  530  515 
  (345)  (337) (338) (375)  (304)  (312) (218)  (346)  (343) 
Total Expenditure  723  799 608 684  745  811 495  728  708 
  (568)  (601) (493) (631)  (504)  (513) (375)  (576)  (545) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.   20
 
Table 2a : Stochastic Dominance Results for all households (comparison over the years) 
  83 vs. 88 83 vs. 93  83 vs. 98 88 vs. 93 88 vs. 98 93 vs. 98
Gross  
Income 
83 >2 88 
(0.61) 
93 >1 83  
(0.363) 
93 >2 83  
(1.000) 
No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.236) 
93 >2 88 
(0.657) 
98 >1 88 
(0.003) 
98 >2 88 
(0.403) 
93 >1 98 
(0.434) 




83 >2 88 
(0.649) 
No SD  83 >1 98 
(0.014) 
83 >2 98 
(0.221) 
93 >1 88 
(0.035) 
93 >2 88 
(0.305) 
No SD  93 >1 98 
 (0.059) 




83 >1 88 
(0.001) 
83 >2 88 
(0.643) 
No SD  No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.001) 
93 >2 88 
(0.615) 
98 >2 88 
(0.188) 





83 >1 88 
(0.003) 
83 >2 88 
(0.644) 
No SD  No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.006) 
93 >2 88 
(0.615) 
98 >1 88 
(0.001) 
98 >2 88 
(0.193) 
93 >1 98 
(0.001) 
93 >2 98 
(0.607) 
 
Table 2b.  Stochastic Dominance Results for all households  
(comparison of pretax, post tax and expenditure distributions) 
 Gross  vs. 
Disposable 
Disposable vs. Total 
Expenditure (EXP1) 
Disposable vs. Non Durable 
Expenditure (EXP2) 
83/84  No SD  No SD  No SD 
88/89  No SD  No SD  No SD 
93/94  No SD  No SD  No SD 
98/99  No SD  Exp1 >1 Pos    (0.02) 
Exp1 >2 Pos    (0.11) 
No SD 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order stochastic dominance Y;  
No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y. The number in parentheses is the probability of SD  
statistics being negative. 
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Table 3: SD Results by Male v Female Headed Households 










83-84  M >1 F (0.239) 
M >2 F (1.000) 
No SD  No SD  No SD 
88-89  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD 
93-94  M >1 F (0.09) 
M >2 F (0.999) 
No SD  M >1 F (0.084) 
M >2 F (0.603) 
M >1 F (0.116) 
M >2 F (0.596) 
98-99  M >1 F(0.006) 
M >2 F(0.142) 
M >1 F (0.478) 
M >2 F (0.632) 
M >1 F (0.134) 
M >2 F (0.461) 
M >1 F (0.122) 
M >2 F (0.446) 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order stochastic dominance Y; 
 No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y. The number in parentheses is the probability of SD statistics being negative. 
 
Table 4: SD Results by households with v without children 










83-84  w/ child  >2 no child 
 (0.089) 
NO SD  No SD  No SD 
88-89  NO SD  w/ child  >2 no child 
(0.055) 
w/ child  >2 no child 
(0.692) 
w/ child >2 no child 
(0.63) 
93-94  w/ child >1 no child 
 (0.194) 
w/ child  >2 no child 
 (1.000) 
w/ child >1 no child 
(0.023) 
w/ child  >2 no child 
(0.248) 
w/ child >1 no child 
(0.039) 
w/ child >2 no child 
(0.496) 
w/ child >1 no child 
(0.125) 
w/  child >2 no child 
(0.534) 
98-99  w/ child  >2 no child 
 (0.54) 
w/ child  >2 no child 
(0.596) 
w/ child >2 no child 
(0.667) 
w/  child >2 no child 
(0.667) 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order stochastic dominance Y;  
No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y. The number in parentheses is the probability of SD statistics being negative. 
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Table 5: SD Results by Single-Parent (S) v Couple-Parent (C) Households  










83-84  C >1 S (0.166) 
C >2 S (1.000) 
NO SD  No SD  No SD 
88-89  NO SD  NO SD  No SD  No SD 
93-94  C >1 S (0.041) 
C >2 S (0.278) 
NO SD  C >1 S (0.068) 
C >2 S (0.642) 
C >1 S (0.317) 
C >2 S (0.642) 
98-99  NO SD  NO SD  No SD  No SD 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order stochastic dominance Y; 
 No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y. The number in parentheses is the probability of SD statistics being negative. 
 
 
Table 6: SD Results by Migrant (Mig) v Non-Migrant (NM) Households 










83-84  NM >1 Mig. 
(0.01) 
NM >2 Mig. 
(0.771) 
NM >2 Mig. 
(0.223) 
NM >2 Mig. 
(0.156) 
NM. >1 Mig. 
(0.001) 
NM. >2 Mig. 
(0.208) 
88-89  Mig. >2 NM 
(0.005) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.006) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.478) 
Mig. >1 NM 
(0.001) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.394) 
93-94  NM >2 mig. 
(0.167) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.474) 
Mig. >1 NM 
(0.002) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.284) 
Mig. >1 NM 
(0.001) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.355) 
98-99  Mig. >2 NM 
(0.016) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.004) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.021) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.017) 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order stochastic dominance Y;  
No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y. The number in parentheses is the probability of SD statistics being negative. 





Definition of Household Groups:   
 
Migrant households are identified from the country of birth of the household head. 
Migrant households are those with heads born overseas; otherwise they are non-migrant 
households.  Male-headed and female-headed households are identified by the survey 
respondent him/herself as it appears in the datafiles (sex of household reference person). 
In most cases – the nuclear family setting -  this is either the husband or wife. In extended 
family settings, this person can be the oldest person (grandparent) in the household or the 
person which provides the greatest financial contribution to the household. Households 
with and without children:  children here are defined as those aged from the very young 
to 24 as long as they are financially dependent on the family for board and lodging. They 
can be single-parent and couple-parent households. Households with children can also 
have multiple adults – and so this definition would accommodate extended family type 
households (ie including grandparents). Households without children can be can consist 
of single-member households, couple only households or other multiple adults living 
together and sharing common board.  
 
Expenditure Variable Definitions: 
 
EXP1 includes all expenditures on Current Housing, Fuel and Power, Food, Alcohol and 
Tobacco, Clothing and Footwear, Household Furnishings and Equipment, Medical and 
Health Care, Transport, Recreation and Entertainment and Personal Care. Total 
expenditures also include expenditures on Income Tax, Superannuation and Life 
Insurance, Mortgage Repayments and Other Capital Housing Costs. 
EXP2 is used to measure non-durable consumption. This is TotExp1 less expenditures on 
all household furnishings and equipment. 
EXP3 is TotExp1 less expenditures jointly labeled as Special Other Payments  (SOP) 
which are expenditures on income tax, mortgage payments, other capital housing costs 
and superannuation and life insurance. 
EXP4  is another measure for non-durable consumption. This is TotExp2 less 
expenditures on all household furnishings and equipment. 
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More Complete Table of Results [includes SD results for EXP3 and EXP4] 
 
Note: X >1 Y means X first-order stochastic dominance Y; X >2 Y means X second-order 
stochastic dominance Y; No SD means no stochastic dominance between X and Y.The 
number in parentheses is the probability of SD statistics being negative. 
 
Table A.2a Stochastic Dominance Results for all households 
  83 vs. 88  83 vs. 93  83 vs. 98  88 vs. 93  88 vs. 98  93 vs. 98 
Gross 
Income 
83 >2 88 
(0.61) 
93 >1 83 
(0.363) 
93 >2 83 
(1.000) 
No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.236) 
93 >2 88 
(0.657) 
98 >1 88 
(0.003) 
98 >2 88 
(0.403) 
93 >1 98 
(0.434) 




83 >2 88 
(0.649) 
No SD  83 >1 98 
(0.014) 
83 >2 98 
(0.221) 
93 >1 88 
(0.035) 
93 >2 88 
(0.305) 
No SD  93 >1 98 
(0.059) 





83 >1 88 
(0.001) 
83 >2 88 
(0.643) 
No SD  No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.001) 
93 >2 88 
(0.615) 
98 >2 88 
(0.188) 





83 >1 88 
(0.003) 
83 >2 88 
(0.645) 
No SD  No SD  93 >1 88 
(0.006) 
93 >2 88 
(0.615) 
98 >1 88 
(0.001) 
98 >2 88 
(0.193) 
93 >1 98 
(0.001) 
93 >2 98 
(0.607) 
Exp3  83 >1 88 
(0.02) 
83 >2 88 
(0.641) 
No SD  98 >1 83 
(0.037) 
98 >2 83 
(0.621) 
No SD  98 >1 88 
(0.011) 
98 >2 88 
(0.632) 
98 >2 93 
(0.002) 
Exp4  83 >2 88 
(0.644) 
83 >2 93 
(0.659) 
98 >1 83 
(0.018) 
98 >2 83 
(0.613) 
88 >2 93 
(0.662) 
98 >1 88 
(0.02) 
98 >2 88 
(0.623) 
98 >2 93 
(0.647) 
 
Table A.2b Table A.2a Stochastic Dominance Results for all households 










83/84  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  Pos >1 Exp 
(0.011) 
Pos >2 Exp 
(0.249) 
88/89  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  Pos >2 Exp 
(0.021) 
93/94  No SD  No SD  No SD  Pos >1 Exp 
(0.027) 
Pos >2 Exp 
(0.64) 
Pos >1 Exp 
(0.032) 
Pos >2 Exp 
(0.64) 
98/99  No SD  Exp >1 Pos  
(0.02) 
Exp >2 Pos  
(0.11) 
Exp >2 Pos  
(0.006) 
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Table A3: SD Results by Migrant (Mig) v Non-Migrant (NM) Households 













83-84  NM >1 Mig. 
(0.01) 
NM >2 Mig. 
(0.771) 
NM. >2 mig. 
(0.223) 
NM. >2 mig. 
(0.156) 
NM >1 mig. 
(0.001) 











88-89  Mig. >2 NM 
(0.005) 
Mig. >2 NM. 
(0.006) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.478) 
Mig. >1 NM. 
(0.001) 














93-94  NM >2 mig. 
(0.167) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.474) 
Mig. >1 NM 
(0.002) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.284) 
Mig. >1 NM 
(0.001) 








98-99  Mig. >2 NM 
(0.016) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.004) 
Mig. >2 NM 
(0.021) 







Table A4: SD Results by Male (M) v Female (F) Headed Households 














83-84  M  >1 F 
(0.239) 
M >2  F 
(1.000) 
No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD 
88-89  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD 
93-94  M >1 F 
 (0.09) 
M >2 F 
(0.999) 
No SD  M >1 F 
(0.084) 
M >2 F 
 (0.603) 
M >1 F (0.116) 
M >2 F (0.596) 
F >2 M 
(0.52) 
F >1 M 
(0.024) 
F >2 M 
(0.652) 
98-99  M >1 F  
(0.006) 
M >2 F 
(0.142) 
M >1 F 
(0.478) 
M >2 F 
 (0.632) 
M >1 F 
 (0.134) 
M >2 F 
 (0.461) 
M >1 F (0.122) 
M >2 F (0.446) 
M>1 F 
(0.077) 
M >2 F 
(0.627) 
M >1 F 
(0.123) 
M >2 F 
(0.632) 
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Table A5: SD Results by households with (With Child) v without children (No 
Child) 














83-84  With child >2 
no child  
(0.089) 
NO SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  With child 
>2 no child 
(0.014) 
88-89  NO SD  With child >2 
no child 
(0.055) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.692) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.63) 
With child 
>2 no child 
(0.624) 
With child 
>2 no child 
(0.616) 
93-94  With child >1 
no child 
(0.194) 
With child >2 
no child 
(1.000) 
With child >1 
no child 
(0.023) 
With child >2 
no child 
(0.248) 
With child >1 no 
child (0.039) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.496) 
With child >1 no 
child (0.125) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.534) 
No SD  No SD 
98-99  With child >2 
no child 
(0.54) 
With child >2 
no child 
(0.596) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.667) 
With child >2 no 
child (0.667) 
With child 
>2 no child 
(0.664) 
With child 




Table A6: SD Results by Single-Parent (S) v Couple-Parent (C) Households  














83-84  C >1 S 
 (0.166) 
C >2 S 
 (1.000) 
NO SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD 
88-89  NO SD  NO SD  No SD  No SD  No SD  No SD 
93-94  C >1 S 
 (0.041) 
C >2 S  
(0.278) 
NO SD  C >1 S  
(0.068) 
C >2 S  
(0.642) 
C >1 S 
(0.317) 
C >2 S  
(0.642) 
No SD  S >2 C 
 (0.575) 
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i See Maasoumi (2000) for an extended discussion.    
ii Higher order dominance rankings (eg third or fourth order) are based on more restricted classes of utility 
functions which reflect aversion to asymmetry, kurtosis and higher order moments. 
iii Regular but infrequent bills are prorated and the expenditure items correspond to average weekly 
amounts.   28
                                                                                                                                                 
iv Sample of households for each year of the survey are:  4492 for the 1983-84 HES,  7225 for the 1988-89 
HES, 8389 for the 1993-94 HES and 6892 for the 1998-99 HES. These households represent around 5 
million Australian households from all over the country for each year the surveys were conducted.   
v This AES is widely used in empirical studies on inequality and lies near the middles of the range of AES 
surveyed in Buhmann, et al (1987). 
vi Barrett et al (2000) notes that using a single price index to deflate expenditures of all  households, 
irrespective of the actual consumption bundle is appropriate only if preferences are homothetic. 
  